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Lines in the Sand: Interstate Groundwater
Disputes in the Supreme Court
Noah D. Hall and Joseph Regalia

S

ince the turn of the twentieth century, states have
brought their battles over shared surface waters to the
U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Constitution grants the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction to hear disputes
between the states—and the Court has concluded that this
includes disputes over surface water. The many rivers and lakes
that low across state boundaries have created a steady stream
of interstate water cases over the past eleven decades.
Now, over a century after the Supreme Court established
precedents for hearing and resolving interstate disputes over
surface water, the Court faces its irst case of a dispute over
interstate groundwater. One might expect the Court to simply use its established surface water doctrines and apply them
to groundwater disputes. Indeed, the modern trend is to treat
disputes over groundwater the same way that we treat disputes
over surface water. But the Court seems to be entertaining the
idea of treating water underground differently from that above
it. The ight between Mississippi and Tennessee will not only
impact the drinking water supply for residents of Memphis;
how the Court ultimately resolves its irst interstate groundwater case will have tremendous implications for national water
policy, state budgets, and the nature of property rights.
Before diving deeper, we must irst ask: What is “groundwater”? Groundwater is water found beneath the Earth’s surface
within the saturated zone of a porous geologic formation
known as an aquifer. In other words, groundwater is water that
is stored not in aboveground formations (such as rivers and
lakes) but instead rests beneath the Earth’s surface in aquifers.
How the Court addresses its irst groundwater case matters because groundwater matters. States have increasingly
relied on groundwater to meet their growing water needs, so
it was only a matter of time before interstate disputes over
this resource reached the nation’s highest court. Notably, this
increase is not driven by people consuming more water. States
are iercely competing for water, but consumption rates have
remained nearly lat for several decades. This is largely because
of developing norms surrounding conservation and restoration
of natural waterbodies. Legislatures, agencies, and other groups
have consistently pushed to maintain and restore surface
water in-stream lows, environmental protections, and ecosystem services. But groundwater is also sought after for other
reasons. It is generally high quality and relatively unpolluted;
widely available through drilling wells and pumping; and typically avoids the conlicts over navigation, recreational use, and
Mr. Hall is an associate professor of law at Wayne State University Law
School in Detroit, Michigan, and may be reached at nhall@wayne.edu.
Mr. Regalia is a judicial clerk in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and an adjunct professor of law at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. He may be reached at veritseekar@gmail.com.

8

habitat for isheries that challenge surface water uses.
So it is unsurprising that the country has increasingly relied
on groundwater. Since 1950, groundwater withdrawals have
more than doubled, from 34 billion gallons per day to 76 billion gallons per day (as of 2010). Groundwater now provides
almost one-ifth of the freshwater used in the United States.
Until the rise of interstate disputes, groundwater use was
almost exclusively a matter of state law. Western states generally use the prior appropriation doctrine (known as irst in
time, irst in right) for groundwater, just as for surface waters.
Eastern states most typically use some form of correlative rights
for groundwater use (like riparian rights for surface waters),
although some states have clung to the old rule of capture in
varying forms. From west to east, the trend is for states to supplement their common law doctrines with statutes regulating
groundwater use by administrative bodies and agencies. And
as groundwater science improves, states have turned their legal
and policy attention to the surface water–groundwater connection and more integrated water management.
As states increasingly rely on groundwater to meet their
freshwater demands, interstate conlicts have emerged across
the country. This article discusses the two most prominent
interstate groundwater disputes, one from the east and one
from the west. The eastern case, Mississippi v. Tennessee, is the
irst interstate groundwater case before the Supreme Court and
will set important precedent for future litigation. The western
case, a dispute between Utah and Nevada, provides a promising alternative to litigation—an interstate compact that could
serve as a model for cooperative management and protection
of shared interstate aquifers.

Mississippi v. Tennessee—the Supreme
Court’s First Interstate Groundwater Case
In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted the
State of Mississippi leave to ile a bill of complaint against the
State of Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and its utility Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division for wrongfully converting
groundwater from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer. Memphis is
just north of the Mississippi border and relies heavily on this
shared aquifer for its municipal water supply. Over a quarter million Memphis residents rely solely on groundwater for
drinking water, making Memphis second only to San Antonio,
Texas, among the nation’s cities that depend solely on groundwater for municipal water supply.
Groundwater withdrawals by Memphis from the shared
aquifer have grown steadily and signiicantly for over a century, paralleling the area’s population growth over the last few
decades. Withdrawals now average over 187 million gallons
per day. According to Mississippi, this means that Memphis
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has been pumping water at rates much higher than that of the
aquifer’s natural recharge rate, resulting in permanent, harmful
changes to a vital source of groundwater. Mississippi does not
suffer from a water shortage itself, but argues that the pumping
of groundwater has resulted in the wrongful conversion of its
state property by Memphis.
Mississippi’s attorney general irst iled suit against Memphis
on the claim of wrongful conversion of state property in 2007
in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi. See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis,
533 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (N.D. Miss. 2008). The city of
Memphis irst responded with a motion to join the state of
Tennessee as a defendant party (which Mississippi opposed).
The district court ruled that Tennessee was a necessary and
indispensable party “because in its absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties to the action,”
but the court did not have the jurisdiction to join the state. Id.
at 649. The district court ultimately ruled that relief could not
be granted until it was determined “which portion of the aquifer’s water is the property of which State.” Id. at 648. The court
cited the Supreme Court’s precedent of applying equitable
apportionment for resolving interstate water disputes, concluding that the Supreme Court would have to apportion the
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer between the two states.
Equitable apportionment is the Supreme Court’s established
common law doctrine for resolving interstate disputes over
shared waters and other natural resources. Equitable apportionment rests on two related rationales. The irst, explained by
Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342–
43 (1931), is a practical one: water is a “necessity of life that
must be rationed among those who have power over it,” and
where two states “have real and substantial interests” in interstate water, those interests “must be reconciled as best they
may be.” The second, derived from our constitutional scheme
and international law, respects the states as sovereigns with
“equality of right,” as described in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.
46, 97–98 (1907), when
the action of one state reaches, through the agency of
natural laws, into the territory of another state, the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the
two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between
them, and this court is called upon to settle that dispute
in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both
and at the same time establish justice between them.
Equitable apportionment is a lexible doctrine and highly
fact-dependent, looking at natural conditions, human needs
and uses, effects and harms, and the states’ relative beneits
and damages. While it was developed and has been used most
commonly for surface waters, the Supreme Court has considered groundwater issues within the equitable apportionment of
groundwater-connected surface water. In Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 114–15 (1907) and Washington v. Oregon, 297
U.S. 517, 524–26 (1936), the Supreme Court recognized that
groundwater connected to a river should be treated as part of
the low of the river in an interstate equitable apportionment
case. Further, in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017,
1024 (1983), the Court held that interstate runs of anadromous ish, such as salmon and steelhead trout, were a resource

that could be equitably apportioned, explicitly drawing parallels to the Court’s water law precedents.

The fight between Mississippi
and Tennessee will not only
impact the drinking water
supply for Memphis; how
the Court resolves its first
interstate groundwater case
will have implications for
national water policy, state
budgets, and property rights.
Instead of pursuing an equitable apportionment claim
against the state of Tennessee before the Supreme Court,
Mississippi appealed the district court’s dismissal to the Fifth
Circuit. Mississippi again argued that Tennessee was not an
indispensable party because the suit did not involve Tennessee’s
sovereign interests. Mississippi further argued against the equitable apportionment of the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer, claiming
that it owned the groundwater resources within its sovereign
territory.
The Fifth Circuit afirmed the district court and held that
the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer was shared interstate water and
must be equitably apportioned “before one state may sue an
entity for invading its share.” Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City
of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 629–30 (5th Cir. 2009). The court
rejected Mississippi’s argument that it owned a “ixed resource”
interest in the aquifer water, stating that water “is not a ixed
resource like a mineral seam, but instead migrates across state
boundaries.” Id. at 630. The Fifth Circuit concluded:
The fact that this particular water source is located
underground, as opposed to resting above ground . . . is
of no analytical signiicance. The Aquifer lows, if slowly,
under several states, and it is indistinguishable from a
lake bordered by multiple states or from a river bordering
several states depending upon it for water.
Id.
Mississippi then iled its irst petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court, based on the same arguments of absolute
ownership of groundwater rejected by the lower courts. When
the Court denied certiorari in 2010, Mississippi v. City of
Memphis, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010), it seemed to tacitly approve
the holdings of lower courts that interstate groundwater disputes must be resolved by equitable apportionment.
But after several years of further study and attempts at a
negotiated resolution, Mississippi came back to the Supreme
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Court for another try in June of 2014. This time it sought
leave to ile a bill of complaint before the Court against the
state of Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and its utility
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division. Mississippi again
argued that it has sovereign ownership of the water being
drawn from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer and that Tennessee’s
pumping is tantamount to wrongful conversion. Mississippi did
not even seek equitable apportionment as an alternative to its
novel wrongful conversion claim. Rather, it requested relief in
the form of “a declaratory judgment establishing Mississippi’s
sovereign right, title and exclusive interest in the groundwater stored naturally in the Sparta Sand formation underlying
Mississippi,” along with $615 million in damages. Bill of Complaint, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 220143 (2014).
Despite opposition from the U.S. solicitor general, the
weight of authority from analogous cases, and unanimous rulings from lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Mississippi
leave to ile its bill of complaint on June 29, 2015. The Supreme
Court’s grant of leave opens the door to three potential outcomes and precedents for deciding interstate groundwater cases.
First, the Court could accept Mississippi’s position that it has a
sovereign ownership of water in the aquifer, and that Tennessee is converting this water regardless of whether this water was
apportioned. This argument would bring back to life the state
ownership theory that was explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in a line of cases culminating in Sporhase v. Nebraska,
458 U.S. 941 (1982). In Sporhase, the Court “traced the demise
of the public ownership theory and deinitively recast it as ‘but
a iction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource.’” 458 U.S. at 951.

The dispute over the Snake
Valley Aquifer, which straddles
the Utah-Nevada border, is
not simply a fight between
two states, but rather a
complex dispute between a
growing distant city in a desert
region, local agriculture, and
environmental protection.
Bringing the state ownership theory back to life would
reverse decades of precedent and signal a radical change in our
natural resources and water law jurisprudence—and it would
signiicantly undermine progress in national policy making.
This approach also would ineficiently deplete state budgets:
using interstate resources will now come with a price tag for
wrongful conversion. Given both precedent and national
policy concerns, the Court should instead apply its equitable apportionment doctrine to groundwater, as both the U.S.
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solicitor general and defendants have argued.
Alternatively, the Court could fashion a rule for interstate
groundwater disputes out of its interstate nuisance doctrine.
Interstate nuisance has the beneit of allowing the Supreme
Court to consider the beneits and harms of different uses of a
shared interstate resource and then determine which uses are
reasonable—without the full technical and legal process of
quantifying and then apportioning the interstate aquifer. Interstate nuisance is most commonly used for pollution. But as
demonstrated in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), it
can be used to restrict one state’s water use to levels that minimize harm to neighboring states, while taking into account
both the need for municipal water use and the importance of
conserving freshwater resources. So the doctrine could be used
here as well.

The Snake Valley Agreement—Utah and
Nevada Craft a Model for Interstate
Cooperation
Although conlicts over shared interstate groundwater are
inevitable, lawsuits are not. Cooperative agreements, formalized as interstate compacts, offer an attractive alternative
to litigation. The Snake Valley Aquifer straddles the UtahNevada border and is a classic example of shared interstate
groundwater. The Snake Valley Aquifer dispute between Utah
and Nevada is a telling case study and resulted in a cooperative
agreement for groundwater protection and management—the
proposed Agreement for Management of the Snake Valley
Groundwater System, available at www.greatlakeslaw.org/iles/
Final_NV_UT_Snake_Valley_Agreement.pdf. Although the
states have yet to adopt the negotiated agreement, it could
serve as a model for other states who want to avoid the strife of
protracted litigation.
The Snake Valley Aquifer dispute is not simply a ight
between two states, but rather a complex dispute between a
growing distant city, local agriculture, and environmental protection. The limited water in this desert region has historically
been used for local agriculture, with the groundwater supporting a small community of residents and farmers on both sides
of the Utah-Nevada border. While local water use for domestic supply and agriculture has remained fairly constant, climate
change has led to a loss of winter snowpack. This is important
because the snowpack feeds the aquifer, and thus future water
supplies will likely shrink. The fragile local balance between
water supply and demand is further threatened by Las Vegas
(300 miles away), which needs water for its growing urban
population. On top of all of this, environmental interests want
to limit total water withdrawals to protect groundwater-dependent ecosystem functions and environmental services, most
notably vegetation that prevents erosion and dust storms.
Since at least 1989, Nevada and Las Vegas have looked
to the Snake Valley Aquifer to meet growing water demand.
Opposing Las Vegas are local interests on both sides of the
Utah-Nevada border. It’s tempting to demonize Las Vegas as a
water-hungry sin city, with a booming population and iconic
images of luxurious water fountains surrounded by arid desert,
but the truth is more complex. Las Vegas has developed some
of the nation’s most progressive and effective water conservation policies, resulting in a decline in per capita water usage.
Despite these conservation measures, Las Vegas and Nevada
face long-term water management challenges, including a
NR&E Fall 2016
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relatively small share of Colorado River water and the impacts
of climate change on snowpack and resulting water supplies.
When the Las Vegas Valley Water District (later succeeded
by the Southern Nevada Water Authority as the utility supplying Las Vegas) began making applications for groundwater in
the Snake Valley, local residents and ranchers were alarmed.
Legal challenges were iled and protests made. While these ights
continue, Nevada has simultaneously pursued building a 300mile pipeline to deliver the distant aquifer water to Las Vegas.
The pipeline route would cross federal land, another potential source of opposition. But Las Vegas has good friends in
the United States Senate. In 2004, Nevada’s Senators Harry
Reid and John Ensign inserted a clause into the Lincoln
County Conservation, Recreation, and Development Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-424, § 301(e)(3), 118 Stat. 2413, 2414
(2004), directing the federal Bureau of Land Management to
release land for the pipeline. However, Utah was already concerned about conlicts over the shared interstate groundwater,
and Utah’s Senator Bob Bennett inserted a clause requiring an
interstate agreement before pumping from any shared basins:
Prior to any transbasin diversion from ground-water
basins located within both the State of Nevada and the
State of Utah, the State of Nevada and the State of
Utah shall reach an agreement regarding the division
of water resources of those interstate ground-water low
system(s) from which water will be diverted and used by
the project. The agreement shall allow for the maximum
sustainable beneicial use of the water resources and protect existing water rights.
Id.
The 2004 act further required that a federal study be conducted of the Snake Valley Aquifer and surrounding region.
The study was delivered to Congress in December 2007. The
study ultimately determined that some excess water lowed out
of the Snake Valley Aquifer, setting the stage for negotiations
over this resource.
During and after the study, Nevada and Utah entered
into nonpublic negotiations to apportion the water, eventually reaching a proposed agreement four years later. Under the
terms of the proposed Snake Valley Agreement, unappropriated excess water would be split roughly evenly between the
two states. Further, the states would implement an extensive
environmental protection and water management scheme with
provisions for ongoing data collection, monitoring, and dispute
resolution. In retrospect, negotiating the terms of the cooperative agreement was easy, or at least rational. It was the political
process of signing the agreement into law, which would typically be done as an interstate compact, which proved to be the
real challenge.
A compact can be understood as a contract between states,
subject to federal approval. Article I, Section 10, of the U.S.
Constitution provides the authority and process for interstate
compacts, requiring congressional approval. As happened with
the proposed Snake Valley Agreement, interstate compacts are
typically negotiated by governors and other state agency oficials. Enactment then requires both the legislative approval of
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all party states and approval by Congress (with presentment
to the president). Once effective, compacts have the full force
and supremacy of federal law, and state commitments can be
enforced in federal court.
Nearly 30 interstate compacts manage shared surface waters
in the United States, including the Great Lakes, the Colorado
River, the Rio Grande, the Arkansas River, the Susquehanna
River, and the Delaware River. A few of these interstate compacts address groundwater resources that are hydrologically
connected to the subject surface-water system. But before the
proposed Snake Valley Agreement, no interstate compact had
focused primarily on shared interstate groundwater.
The Snake Valley Agreement began with a premise “to
work cooperatively to . . . resolve present or future controversies” over the shared groundwater, “assure the quantity and
quality of the Available Groundwater Supply,” “minimize the
injury to Existing Permitted Users,” “minimize environmental impacts,” “maximize the water available for Beneicial Use
in each State,” and “manage the hydrologic basin as a whole.”
While “[t]he Agreement does not grant any water rights,” it
“allocates the Snake Valley groundwater resources between
the two States, and provides for the joint management of the
aquifer.” This preserves the regulatory authority and decision
making of the states for groundwater withdrawals within their
respective borders.
Not all good policy deeds get rewarded politically. After the
release of the Snake Valley Agreement, Utahns rallied against
it. Much of the opposition was based on mistrust and rivalry
with Las Vegas, rather than concerns with the terms of the
agreement itself. Because of public opposition, Utah Governor Gary Herbert delayed signing the document for four years,
and in 2013, ultimately announced that he would not sign
the Snake Valley Agreement. He explained that “[a] majority
of local residents do not support the agreement with Nevada.
Therefore, I cannot in good conscience sign the agreement
because I won’t impose a solution on those most impacted
that they themselves cannot support” and “[t]here is no more
complex and emotional issue with which I have grappled as
governor of this great state.” Press Release, Ofice of the Utah
Governor, Governor Will Not Sign Snake Valley Water Agreement (Apr. 3, 2013), available at www.utah.gov/governor/
news_media/article.html?article=8675.
The political demise of the Snake Valley Agreement may
prove only temporary, as potential litigation often causes parties to rethink previously rejected settlement agreements.
However, regardless of its political fate, the Snake Valley
Agreement should be used as a model for states with conlicts
over shared groundwater resources. But ultimately, the motivation for entering into cooperative agreements is linked to
the outcome of the Mississippi v. Tennessee case. If the Supreme
Court sides with Mississippi and adopts the state ownership
theory for groundwater, states may not be motivated to cooperate to manage interstate groundwater. Instead, they might
choose to invest in determining their respective property and
assessing damages for wrongful conversion. Hopefully the
Court recognizes the shared interstate nature of groundwater
and applies equitable apportionment or interstate nuisance.
This way, states will see the beneits of proactive and cooperative management over litigation when it comes to this
critically important natural resource.
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